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This paper focuses on the optimal allocation between health and lifestyle choices when a society is 
concerned about both fairness and forgiveness. Based on the idea of fresh starts, we construct a social 
ordering that permits us to make welfare assessments when it is acceptable to compensate individuals 
who have mismanaged their initial endowment. Our social rule also allows for the inclusion of the 
fairness approach in the model, to deal with the well-known clash between the principle of compensation 
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1 Introduction
There is a clear consensus that health is one of the most crucial dimensions
of individual well-being. As Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) highlight,
“health care is also important because it contributes to better health, and
perhaps also directly to a higher welfare level”. When evaluating differences
in both health and health care, it must be taken into account that they
may contain elements of very different origin. From the perspective of the
fairness theory, it is crucial to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
sources of inequality. The former are those variables for which the individual
is responsible, such as lifestyle. The latter refers to external circumstances
that cannot be controlled by the individual, such as family, cultural, and
socioeconomic backgrounds.1 The central aim of any fairness policy is to
remove any outcome differences that are a result of illegitimate sources of
inequality (see for instance Rawls 1971, Cohen 1989, Roemer 1998).
Individual preferences are one of the key elements that determine the
need for health care. Many of our illnesses are caused by lifestyle choices,
such as drinking and smoking too much, having an unhealthy diet, or not get-
ting enough exercise. Although there is some ethical debate regarding purely
lifestyle-based differences, they are usually viewed as a legitimate source of
inequality in both health and health care (see Fleurbaey and Schokkaert
2011).
However, in certain situations, health and freedom are in tension. A
good illustration of this tension is the various smoking bans that have been
passed worldwide in the last decade. Apart from preventing the exposure
to second-hand smoke, these pieces of legislation clearly aim to restrict the
consumption of tobacco. Other such limitations on unhealthy habits include
regulations on alcohol and both the size and the advertising of junk food.
We use the concept of forgiveness to model a scenario with restrictions
on unhealthy habits. This approach was formally proposed by Fleurbaey
(2005a), who designed a mechanism that aims to compensate individuals
who ex post regret their past decisions. The model includes both initial
constraints and subsequent compensation to provide regretful individuals
with a fresh start. Likewise, present health policies limit the practice of
certain unhealthy habits but they also provide treatment for individuals
who are not in good health.
With regard to the issue of fairness and responsibility, extensive research
1Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) make an extensive account of what factors should
be considered as either legitimate or illegitimate sources of inequality.
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has found that alternative definitions of justice may lead to incompatible
results (see Fleurbaey 2008). However, research has not yet addressed how
the implementation of a fresh start policy impacts on these results. Here,
we seek to unite these two approaches.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the existing mod-
els that include forgiveness or fairness, and it also shows the impossibility
of implementing both principles in relation to health. Section 3 introduces
our model and describes the ethical requirements imposed on our social or-
dering rule; its derivation is presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the
implications of implementing the fresh start policy, and it presents a nu-
merical computation for a particular parameter configuration of the model.
Section 6 reviews the conclusions of this study. All proofs are contained in
the Appendix.
2 Fresh starts and fairness
The concept of forgiveness in fairness was presented in a discussion between
Dworkin (2000, 2002) and Fleurbaey (2002). Policies based on this principle
aim to deal with individuals who experience genuine changes in their pref-
erences and regret preceding decisions. More precisely, forgiveness refers to
situations in which individuals make choices according to some initial pref-
erences, but they get utility from alternative final ones, and hence they want
their situation to be evaluated with the latter set of preferences. There is
still much debate as to whether such agents should be awarded a fresh start,
or if they should have to bear the consequences of their earlier choices.
Figure 1 provides a clear illustration of the problem. Let us suppose that
each individual has an exogenously given initial amount of resources that she
has to allocate between two different goods that we can interpret as present
consumption (x), and an alternative good (y) such as future consumption,
health status, education, leisure, etc. We use the label prudent (P ) to
describe all those individuals who present balanced preferences between both
goods. Any individual who has a biased preference for one of the two goods,
x in our example, is called a spendthrift (S).2 In the optimal solution, a
prudent agent would opt for allocation P , while a spendthrift individual
would prefer S. Let us assume now that, after having made their decision, a
fraction of the spendthrifts realise that they have made a mistake and wish
they had behaved as prudent agents. We call these individuals regretful (R).
2Although such a nomenclature may be confusing, throughout this paper we have opted
to use that utilised by Fleurbaey (2005a).
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Figure 1: Forgiveness
Therefore, their final or true preferences are given by the dashed indifference
curve; therefore, each regretful individual incurs a positive utility loss for
their past choice.
There is an interesting debate of how individuals who regret their past
choices should be handled. Some authors argue that it may be extremely un-
forgiving to deny them any help. Others, such as Arneson (1989) or Dworkin
(2002), assert that rewarding spendthrift individuals for hard work they have
never performed may generate a perverse incentive scheme. Along the same
lines, the equal opportunity principle states that individuals should be held
responsible for their previous choices. This ethical view is challenged by
Fleurbaey (2005a), who proposes setting up an ex ante incentive-compatible
mechanism with the aim of giving more possibilities to those who misman-
age their initial share of resources. He shows that, ex ante, one cannot
unambiguously assert that the forgiveness policy reduces freedom.
To verify the validity of any principle, including forgiveness, we must
define an equivalent situation that allows us to make interpersonal compar-
isons regardless of the specific form of the utility functions. Such equiva-
lents must be grounded in individual preferences. For instance, Fleurbaey
(2005a) makes use of the Equivalent Initial Share (EIS), which is defined as
the minimum amount of resources that the individual would need to obtain
an allocation that yields exactly the same level of utility as the current al-
location. In our previous example, this value equals the initial endowment
for both the prudent and the spendthrifts. In the case of the regretful, this
value is smaller because they could have reached the same level of utility
with a lower amount of resources. Therefore, the difference between the ini-
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Figure 2: Equivalent Initial Share
tial endowment and the EIS can be used to correctly build inter-comparable
measures of utility loss. More precisely, Fleurbaey (2005a) suggests that
the optimal redistribution policy should make the smallest EIS as high as
possible. This policy entails a compromise between respecting individual
preferences and giving all agents the possibility of a fresh start. The policy
can be easily implemented by means of a specific scheme of initial taxes and
subsequent transfers (see Figure 2).
Such a mechanism sounds natural when dealing with the allocation of
money between two periods, but is not so simple when dealing with health.
In that scenario, we cannot assure that a transfer from the rich to the poor
will always improve social welfare because the final result also depends on
the individuals’ health status. Fleurbaey and Trannoy (2003) show that,
to respect the Pareto criterion, interpersonal comparisons should be made
at the value of the perfect health status, h∗. As it is shown in Figure 2,
maximising the minimum EIS does not take into account such a reference
value.
Additionally, if we want to include the idea of responsibility in the model,
we should be well aware that there are two mainstream approaches to its
inclusion. The principle of compensation states that differences not due
to responsibility should be eliminated. Conversely, the principle of reward
says that inequalities due to responsibility should be left untouched. There
is extensive proof that it is impossible to simultaneously put these two prin-
ciples into practice.3 The most commonly used strategy to address this
3See Fleurbaey (2008) for a detailed explanation of the problem.
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Figure 3: Healthy-Equivalent Consumption
difficulty is to focus on the first principle, and afterwards implement the
second principle to the maximum extent possible. Examples of this strategy
are Fleurbaey (2005b) and Valletta (2009). The former study deals with
the problem of responsibility in a specific model of health, while the latter
study extends the strategy to a more general framework. These authors
propose focusing on the Healthy-Equivalent Consumption, which consists of
the minimum amount of money that any individual would accept to increase
her current level of health to the state of perfect health. Graphically speak-
ing, this amount would be the point where the indifference curve intersects
with the line of perfect health status. Therefore, the solution would lie in
maximising the minimum healthy-equivalent consumption while trying to
move the indifference curves as far away as possible. The result of using the
healthy-equivalent consumption is depicted in Figure 3.
In such a case, all agents would be obliged to behave as if they were
prudent individuals and no further redistribution would be needed. Inter-
estingly, despite the fact that the problem was triggered by the regretful
group, such agents would end up in their most preferred feasible allocation,
and their mistake would be borne entirely by the spendthrifts.4
Therefore, if we want to solve the problem of forgiveness, it is not optimal
to directly utilise the notion of healthy-equivalent consumption; in short,
these two concepts clash with one another.
4Moreover, if at the time of collecting taxes the planner could differentiate between
individuals, we would obtain the bizarre result that the spendthrifts should have to make
additional transfers to the rest of agents.
5
Proposition 1 There is no social ordering that maximises both the mini-
mum Equivalent Initial Share and the minimum healthy-equivalent consump-
tion.
Proposition 1 indicates that both principles aim to solve very different
problems. Our objective in the remainder of the paper is twofold. First, we
propose a social ordering capable of bringing these two approaches together;
and second, we study the consequences of implementing such an ordering.
3 The model and the ethical principles
Consider an economy that consists of one social planner and a finite set of
individuals N = {1, . . . , i, . . . , n}. Health is a variable that ranges from 0
(full ill-health) to 1 (perfect health), that is, H = [0, 1], where h∗ := 1.
Consumption is interpreted as the expenditure on unhealthy goods ci ∈
C ⊆ R++ (unhealthy lifestyle). The price of the latter is given by pc ∈
R++, while the cost of health is ph ∈ R++. Agent i ∈ N has an initial
endowment wi ∈ R++ that she allocates in a health-consumption bundle
zi = (ci, hi) ∈ Z := C × H, which designates the situation in which the
individual has a chronic health state hi and consumption ci. We define the
health-consumption feasible set as the set of bundles that the individual can
afford, that is:
Definition 1 ∀i ∈ N , we define the individual i’s health-consumption fea-
sible set Mi as:
Mi = {(c, h) ∈ Z : c ∗ pc + h ∗ ph ≤ wi}
Every agent i ∈ N has well-defined preferences Ri over the space Z :=
C × H, which are described by a complete preorder, that is to say a bi-
nary relation that is reflexive, transitive, and complete. The preferences,
apart from being a complete preorder, must also be continuous, convex, and
strictly monotonic. LetR denote the set of such preferences. (c, h) %i (c
′, h′)
means that the individual i weakly prefers to live in a health state h with
consumption c, rather than consume c′ in a health state h′. Strict preference
and indifference are denoted by i and ∼i respectively. Moreover, prefer-
ences are assumed to satisfy the single-crossing property ; that is, any two
indifference curves of two different preferences cross no more than once. In
other words, for any (c, h), (c′ , h′) ∈ Z, we say that individual preferences
Ri ∈ R present a higher concern for health than those of Rj ∈ R if the
following relations hold:
6
{
c′ > c and (c, h) ∼j (c
′, h′)⇒ (c, h) i (c
′, h′)
c′ < c and (c, h) ∼i (c
′, h′)⇒ (c, h) j (c
′, h′)
}
It is important to stress that such an ordering refers to the agents’ final
preferences, that is, the ones that are going to be used to evaluate overall
welfare, and not to the initial ones. However, we have to take into account
that the individuals’ bundles are determined by some initial preferences that
may or may not coincide with the final ones.
An allocation describes all individuals’ bundles, that is, z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈
Zn. Under such conditions it is possible to define the agent i’s healthy-
equivalent consumption as follows:
Definition 2 ∀i ∈ N and Ri ∈ R, with z ∈ Z
n, we define the individual i’s
healthy-equivalent consumption c∗i (z) as:
c∗i (z) = min{c
′ ∈ C : (c′, h∗) %i (ci, hi)}
that is, c∗i (z) is the smallest consumption the individual would be willing
to accept to exchange her present bundle for one in which she has perfect
health.
Before we continue our analysis it is important to discuss the effect of
uncertainty on the final level of health. We have assumed that this value is
perfectly determined by the expenditure on unhealthy consumption alone.
Alternatively, we can understand such a deterministic relation as the health
status in which the agent will be left, given her previous lifestyle. Any agent
that does not get sick would be in a sort of ideal situation, in which there
is no trade-off between lifestyle and health whatsoever.
Finally, we characterise the situation that maximises the agent’s true
preferences. More precisely, we define the individual i’s most preferred bun-
dle as the point in which she would be maximising her final preferences if
she were the richest individual in the society. Formally:
Definition 3 ∀i ∈ N and Ri ∈ R, we define the individual i’s most pre-
ferred bundle zi0 ∈ M¯ as the bundle that satisfies:
zi0 %i (c, h), ∀(c, h) ∈ M¯
where M¯ = maxiMi is the largest health-consumption feasible set.
7
The reason why we propose this specific definition is twofold. First,
it will allow us to describe the gap between the individual’s actual and
most preferred bundle. Second, the idea of fixing the highest endowment
as the reference value permits us to introduce the inequality of opportunity
principle in the model. Let us then denote z0 = (z
1
0 , . . . , z
n
0 ) ∈ Z
n as the
most preferred allocation.
With a profile of preferences, R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ D, we can define a
social order R(R) (P(R)) over all allocations, where zR(R)z′ (zP(R)z′)
means that the allocation z is at least as good as (preferred to) z′. We
assume that social preferences are described by a complete preorder.
According to such a profile of preferences, we can define the following
ethical principles. The first one is Pareto efficiency, which is a minimal
requirement that ensures the solution is efficient:
Axiom 1 (Strong Pareto): ∀R ∈ D; z, z′ ∈ Zn, if zi %i z
′
i for all i ∈ N ,
and zj j z
′
j for some j ∈ N , then zP(R)z
′.
The final result will be driven by the way in which transfers are proposed.
For instance, the result obtained by Fleurbaey (2005b) is given by the Pigou-
Dalton axiom, in which a transfer from a rich individual to a poor one is
always desirable provided they are in perfect health. Valletta (2009) obtains
his result by assuming that transfers do not need to add up to zero; that is,
it does not matter how much wealth the rich lose, as long as the poor are
better off and still poorer than the rich. Here we opt for a slight variation
of Hammond’s (1976) equity axiom:
Axiom 2 (Hammond Transfer) ∀R ∈ D; z, z′ ∈ Zn; if there exist i, j ∈ N
such that,
c∗i (z0)− c
∗
i (z
′) ≥ c∗i (z0)− c
∗
i (z) > c
∗
j (z0)− c
∗
j(z) ≥ c
∗
j(z0)− c
∗
j (z
′)
with zk = z
′
k ∀k 6= i, j, then zP(R)z
′.
Our variation of this equity axiom entails some properties that must be
carefully explained. Firstly, it implies an infinite aversion to inequality be-
cause monetary transfers are always desirable so long as the ‘rich’ remain
‘richer’ than the ‘poor’. The main distinction from the more standard prin-
ciples, such as the Pigou-Dalton axiom, is that we use the healthy-equivalent
consumption in the most preferred allocation as a point of reference to check
whether the transfer is in fact welfare-enhancing. If there were no budget
constraints, the most preferred allocation would tend to infinity and our
axiom would coincide with traditional principles.
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Furthermore, the Equal Preferences Priority principle5 can be derived
from Axiom 2, implying that, ideally, two equally responsible individuals
should end up with the same final bundle. This is exactly the spirit of the
principle of compensation, so our social ordering approach is going to be in
line with the literature that gives priority to that principle.
Finally, notice that we have anchored the transfers at the value of perfect
health. In this case, the healthy-equivalent consumption would equal the in-
dividual’s consumption, making interpersonal comparisons more tractable.
Moreover, as Fleurbaey and Trannoy (2003) prove, the application of a
multi-dimensional version of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle may clash
with the Pareto condition.
4 Social ordering and forgiveness
Having defined the basic elements of our model, we proceed to describe the
optimal social ordering that, without violating the principle of responsibility,
aims to give the regretful a fresh start. To carry out the analysis we first
introduce the following concept.
Definition 4 ∀i ∈ N , let the regret function ρi(z) be the individual i’s
healthy-equivalent consumption deviation between the most preferred alloca-
tion and her actual bundle, as shown in the following equation:
ρi(z) = c
∗
i (z0)− c
∗
i (z)
This function provides us with a specific (monetary) measure of the
utility loss due to not being in the most preferred bundle. Notice that such
a gap can be caused both by changes in the preferences and by differences
in the initial amount of resources. This function permits us to obtain the
main proposition of the present paper.
Proposition 2 If social preferences satisfy Strong Pareto, and Hammond
Transfer, then for any profile R ∈ D and allocations z, z′ ∈ Z we have that:
maxi ρi(z) < maxi ρi(z
′)⇒ zP(R)z′
Specifically, the social ordering minimises the maximum value of the regret
function across the population. A graphical representation of this measure
is given in Figure 4.
5Formally, ∀z, z′ ∈ Zn, if there exist i, j ∈ N with Ri = Rj such that, (c
′
j , h
′
j) j
(cj , hj) j (ci, hi) i (c
′
i, h
′
i) with zk = z
′
k ∀k 6= i, j, then zP(R)z
′.
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Figure 4: Minimisation of the regret function
For ease of exposition, let us assume that there are just two kind of
preferences, those of the prudent (P ) and those of the spendthrifts (S), with
the former having a higher concern for health than the latter. Additionally,
the regretful individuals (R) are those agents who share their choice with the
spendthrifts but get utility according to the prudent’s preferences. Under a
laissez-faire policy, the prudent, the spendthrifts, and the regretful would
choose P0, S0 and R0 respectively, which are the most preferred bundles
for the first two types. However, this is not the case for a regretful agent,
who suffers a positive well-being loss. In this scenario Proposition 2 states
that moving to an alternative allocation in which the individuals’ bundles
are P1, S1 and R1 will improve welfare, since the largest regret function is
smaller than that of the initial scenario.
A remarkable facet of our social ordering is that the final result is driven
by the hypothetical allocation z0, and hence it says nothing about the in-
dividual initial share of resources. The equal opportunity principle is also
included in our model, as we are assuming that within each type the most
preferred bundle is exactly the same for all, that is, for any pair i, j ∈ N
who belongs to the same type t ∈ T = {P, S,R}, we have that zi0 = z
j
0
= zt0.
In this case, the regret function takes into account not only the welfare loss
due to the changes in preferences, but also the loss derived from the unequal
distribution of the initial endowment. Consequently, within every type of in-
dividuals there exists equality of opportunity when all individuals belonging
to the same type have also the same regret function value.
To conclude, we would like to stress once more that if there were no
endowment limitations, the hypothetical allocation z0 would tend to infinity.
10
Under such a scenario, our social ordering would recommend maximising
the minimum healthy-equivalent consumption, and hence our result would
converge to that proposed by Fleurbaey (2005b)
So far we have established a specific rule that permits us to make welfare
assessments in the present context; however, we have said nothing about the
way in which compensation should be paid. This task will be undertaken in
the next section.
5 Implementing the fresh start policy
When implementing forgiveness, we opt to keep the model as simple as
possible. From this moment on we assume that all individuals have the
same initial endowment, ∀i ∈ N,wi = w ∈ R++; that is, we no longer
consider the existence of differences in opportunity. Put differently, the
health-consumption feasible set is the same for all agents, Mi = M¯ ,∀i ∈ N .
As in the general framework, the amount of resources devoted to medical
consumption determines the individual’s final level of health. For ease of
exposition, we assume that the price of both goods is equal to 1.
We focus on the case of the three types of individuals defined at the
end of the previous section. A fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of the population are
spendthrifts, and after having determined their expenditure on unhealthy
habits, a proportion α ∈ (0, 1) of them regret their choices and wish they
had behaved as prudent agents.
According to what can be currently observed in western societies, there
are two main ways of designing a national health care system. First, there
exists the traditional model of collecting taxes to fund a public health care
service that treats all individuals that are not in good health. Second, several
countries have recently passed numerous pieces of legislation to limit or ban
certain unhealthy habits. The first measure affects all individuals in the
society, but particularly impacts on those who are prudent because they are
being taxed to fund a public service they are unlikely to use. The second
measure affects only those agents that lead an unhealthy lifestyle, in our
case the non-regretful spendthrifts.
Therefore, social planners should aim to find a fair balance between both
measures. That is precisely what we describe in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of spendthrifts become prudent ex
post, the allocation that minimises the highest ρi(z) across the economy is
such that:
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• The well-being loss, measured by the regret function, is the same for
all individuals.
• The final policy is determined by both the agents’ preferences and the
proportion of spendthrifts within the economy.
• Prudent individuals have the highest level of health in the economy,
while the spendthrifts and the regretful spend more on unhealthy habits.
As mentioned previously, a public authority has two different tools;
namely, it can tax agents to treat ill individuals, and it can limit the con-
sumption of goods that are harmful to health. Therefore, the planner’s
policy consists of both a consumption restriction ĉ, and an income tax t
that can be used to treat individuals in bad health status. As shown in
Figure 5, a prudent agent faces a positive utility loss because the introduc-
tion of the tax leaves her with less resources. Spendthrifts are also worse
off because they too have less money, and they also cannot consume their
preferred quantity of the unhealthy goods. In fact, the spendthrifts always
choose the maximum permitted level of unhealthy consumption. After all
individuals have made their choices, the planner must treat the spendthrifts
and the regretful equally because it is not possible to distinguish between
them. The final health treatments must leave both in the same indifference
curve as the prudent, and it must also make the utility loss equal for all
types. It is important to stress that perfect equality may not be achieved in
a different scenario. If we add an additional type of preferences, we can no
longer assure that a transfer from one type to another would not affect the
well-being of an individual from the third group. Therefore, our equality
result cannot be extended to a more generalised framework.
We conclude our analysis by presenting a numerical example of how
such a public policy may be designed. The utility function in our example
is taken from Fleurbaey (2005b). Let us assume that any individual i ∈ N
has preferences represented by the function,
ui(ci, hi) = cih
δi
i
with δP = 1.5 > 0.5 = δS . Every individual is also characterised by her
initial endowment, which is assumed to be equal for all agents; more pre-
cisely, wi = 1,∀i ∈ N . The population is equally split between prudent and
regretful agents. The results of the optimal allocation are presented in Table
1.
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Figure 5: Implementation of the social ordering
Table 1: Results of the numerical example
Prudent Spendthrift Regretful
zP = (0.4; 0.6) zS = (0.66; 0.33) zR = (0.66; 0.33)
ρP = 0 ρS = 0 ρR = 0.0576031
z′P = (0.395; 0.5925) z
′
S = (0.55; 0.4751) z
′
R = (0.55; 0.4751)
ρ′P = 0.0058 ρ
′
S = 0.0058 ρ
′
R = 0.0058
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Without the planner’s intervention, the prudent clearly consume less
than the spendthrifts, and hence their level of health is higher. The regret
of these two types is obviously 0 because both are properly maximising
utility, which is not the case for the regretful.
To compensate the regretful, the public authority taxes all individuals
(t = 1.26%) to treat those who are in bad health status, but at the same time
limits the consumption of unhealthy habits (ĉ = 55%). As a result, the pru-
dent end up with a lower level of both health and consumption, and hence
their well-being decreases. This policy means that both the spendthrift and
the regretful consume less but will increase their health status. However, as
the spendthrifts have stronger preferences for consumption, they also expe-
rience a positive utility loss. Notice that, as expected, all individuals finish
with the same loss of well-being; that is, the burden of the mistake made by
the regretful is borne equally by all members of the society. However, the
situation of the regretful would otherwise be so poor that the redistribution
means that the overall society is ex post better off.
Finally, the optimal policy is affected by changes in the exogenous pa-
rameters. Figure 6a shows that as the proportion of spendthrifts tends to
zero (λ → 0), the optimal policy leaves the prudent with the same bundle
as in the case in which they choose freely. This is an obvious result because
the other types are vanishing, and hence the public authority is no longer
needed. In principle, the values of the final allocation do not change signif-
icantly with λ, although the actual health policy is extremely influenced by
the actual value of that parameter.
In Figure 6b we show how the policy changes with individual valuations
of health. The solution becomes extreme when the spendthrifts do not care
about health at all. In this scenario, any restriction on unhealthy habits
has such a high utility cost that it cannot be implemented; consequently,
the social planner is forced to raise more money because the spendthrifts
have a very poor health status. The level of the social planner’s intervention
disappears as both attitudes towards health converge.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have derived a social rule for a scenario in which a society
cares about both the fairness and the forgiveness principles.
We have devoted the first part of the paper to introducing two differ-
ent issues. First, we have presented the framework of forgiveness, a largely
unstudied approach that advocates compensating those individuals that re-
14
(a) Variations in the proportion of agents (b) Variations in the discount factor
Figure 6: Variations in the exogenous parameters
gret their past choices. Second, we have discussed the theories of fairness
and responsibility, along with the clash between the compensation and re-
ward principles. We have shown that traditional policies dealing with both
frameworks are incompatible in relation to health.
In the second part of the paper we have made use of some ethical princi-
ples to reach a compromise between the principles of forgiveness and fairness.
To make interpersonal comparisons of utility, we have proposed using the
distance between the actual allocation and a hypothetical most preferred
one. Such a definition allows us to compare individuals with different pref-
erences and different endowments, introducing the opportunity principle in
the model. Our social rule establishes that any redistribution policy should
aim to minimise the highest well-being loss in the population, suggesting
that the burden of the regretful individual’s mistakes should be borne by all
individuals.
In the last part of the paper, we have proposed a specific way of making
compensations when a trade-off between health and lifestyle preferences ex-
ists. We have advocated balancing legislation that limits unhealthy habits
and raising money through taxation to treat patients. The need for balance
comes from the fact that taxes mostly harm responsible agents, whereas
15
the consumption restrictions harm only those individuals that prefer to lead
an unhealthy lifestyle. These two measures give the public authority the
possibility of compensating individuals that regret their past choices.
In closing, we would like to discuss two aspects of the assumptions we
have made. First, we have dealt with health from a one-dimensional view-
point. In reality, it is a multidimensional issue that includes various matters
such as heart condition, motor function, mental condition, etc. However,
when evaluating overall health status many economists prefer to use mea-
sures that summarise all these conditions in a single variable, such as the
popular quality-adjusted life year (QALY). Therefore, we can consider our
definition of health as the final value of such variable. Second, we have
considered any level of health as acceptable as long as it maximises the in-
dividual well-being. This is controversial in the field of health as it implies
that any agent can freely choose her level of health. In the real world, we
find that the public authority guarantees all individuals a minimum level of
health, no matter their preferences. We can easily introduce this require-
ment into our model by assuming that all individuals must have a certain
minimum health status. The optimal policy would then be more extreme,
but it would keep the same spirit of the policy presented here.
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Take an economy with two agents that have the same initial en-
dowment w, but different preferences between health and consumption. Ac-
cording to Figure 7 individual x presents a higher preference for health than
individual y. We also have that the minimum EIS is maximised at value w,
since it is impossible to increase the utility of one individual without mak-
ing the other one worse off. Notice that this allocation does not maximise
the minimum healthy-equivalent consumption, which is given by c∗(x). To
maximise such a value, the planner must transfer money from individual y
to individual x until both end up consuming bundles y′ and x′ respectively.
In this case the healthy-equivalent consumption values are equal for both
individuals, that is c∗(x′) = c∗(y′). However, this new situation implies that
agent x’s new EIS is w + t, which is clearly bigger than the individual y’s
one, w − t. Therefore, the initial condition of equal EIS no longer holds.
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Figure 7: Proof of Proposition 1
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. This proof is based on the result obtained by Valletta (2009). Let
us consider two different individuals j, k ∈ N and two allocations z, z′ ∈ Zn
such that zm = z
′
m ∀m 6= j, k; with ρj(z
′) > max{ρj(z), ρk(z), ρk(z
′)}. First,
we are going to prove that if maxi ρi(z) < maxi ρi(z
′), then zP(R)z′. If
ρk(z) < ρk(z
′), using strong Pareto we directly obtain that zP(R)z′. Let
us consider the case that ρk(z) > ρk(z
′). Contrary to the desired result,
let us assume that z′R(R)z. Take any allocation z′′ ∈ Zn such that ∀m 6=
j, k, z′′m = zm, whereas z
′′
j and z
′′
k are chosen such that ρj(z
′′) = ρj(z
′)−ε and
ρk(z
′′) = ρj(z
′)− 2ε, where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small number. Therefore,
by Hammond transfer we have that z′′P(R)z′. Assume now that ρj(z) <
ρk(z) (when the relation is the other way round the proof is analogous to
the one presented here). Let us choose a new allocation z′′′ ∈ Zn such that
∀m 6= j, k, z′′′m = zm, whereas z
′′′
j and z
′′′
k are chosen such that ρj(z
′′′) =
ρj(z) − ε and ρk(z
′′′) = ρk(z) + ε < ρk(z
′′). Because both individuals are
better off, by strong Pareto we have then that z′′′P(R)z′′. Since ρk(z
′′′) >
ρk(z) > ρj(z) > ρj(z
′′′), using Hammond transfer and strong Pareto it is
straightforward to check that zP(R)z′′′. Finally, by transitivity we have
that zP(R)z′, which yields the desired contradiction.
Take now two allocations z, z′ ∈ Zn such that maxi ρi(z) < maxi ρi(z
′).
By monotonicity of preferences, one can find two allocations x, x′ such that
∀i, hi = h
∗, and z i x, x
′ i z
′. Moreover, there exists i0 such that for all
i 6= i0
ρi(x
′
i) < ρi(xi) < ρi0(xi0) < ρi0(x
′
i0
)
From now on, all allocations considered have perfect health for all agents.
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Let Q = N \ {i0} and let us assume a sequence of allocations (x
q)1≤q≤|Q|+1
such that
c∗i (x
q) = c∗i (x
′), ∀i ∈ Q : i ≥ q
c∗i (x
q) = c∗i (x), ∀i ∈ Q : i < q
while
c∗i0(x) = c
∗
i0
(x|Q|+1) > c∗i0(x
|Q|) > . . . > c∗i0(x
1) = c∗i0(x
′)
This implies that ρi0(x
q) > ρi0(x
q+1) > ρq(x
q+1) > ρq(x
q), while for all
j 6= q, i0, we have that ρj(x
q) = ρj(x
q+1). As we have previously proved,
it must be the case that xq+1P(R)xq, ∀q ∈ Q. According to the initial
assumptions, zP(R)x|Q|+1 and x1P(R)z′. Finally, by transitivity we have
that zP(R)z′.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let z = (zP , zS , zR) ∈ Z
n denote an allocation, with zt = (c
z
t , h
z
t ),∀t ∈
T = {P, S,R}. Incentive compatibility requires that for all types t, t′ ∈ T ,
zt %t zt′ . Moreover, the regretful and the spendthrifts must end up with
the same bundle, zR = zS , as they make the same initial choice and af-
terwards it is impossible to distinguish between them. Fleurbaey (2005a)
shows that for any incentive-compatible allocation z, there exists another
incentive-compatible allocation x such that zt′ = xt′ for all t
′ ∈ L ⊂ T ,
and
∑
t∈T pt(c
x
t + h
x
t ) <
∑
t∈T pt(c
z
t + h
z
t ), where pt is the proportion of
the population that have preferences t. It must be the case that in any
optimal allocation, all resources are exhausted, that is,
∑
t∈T pt(h
z
t + c
z
t ) =
w. Let us assume an incentive-compatible allocation x ∈ Zn such that∑
t∈T pt(h
x
t + c
x
t ) < w. If xP = xS , we can find εP , εS > 0, such that replac-
ing the original allocation x by (cxP + εP , h
x
P ) and (c
x
S + εS , h
x
S), we would
obtain a new feasible incentive-compatible allocation in which all individuals
are better off. Let us take now that xP 6= xS. Because of the single-crossing
property and incentive-compatibility it must be the case that xP %P xS
and xS %S xP . By monotonicity there exists ε, δ > 0 such that replacing
xP and xS by x
ε
P = (c
x
P + ε, h
x
P ) and x
δ
S = (c
x
S + δ, h
x
S) yields a feasible and
incentive-compatible allocation in which all individuals are better off, see
Figure 8. Therefore, an allocation x ∈ Zn such that
∑
t∈T pt(h
x
t + c
x
t ) < w
cannot be optimal.
•We start the proof showing that in the final allocation all bundles must
be in the indifference curve of the prudent. Let us assume an incentive-
compatible allocation z ∈ Zn in which, for some t, zt P zt′ . Additionally,
we know that it must be the case that zR = zS . In this case we have
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Figure 8: Proof of Proposition 3
that zP P zR, because zR P zP is not incentive-compatible. Since the
bundles of the regretful and the prudent individuals are not equivalent it
must be the case that ρP 6= ρR, but in this case incentive-compatibility
does not hold. Therefore, such an allocation cannot be optimal, and hence
zt ∼P zt′ , ∀t, t
′ ∈ T .
Regarding the value of the well-being loss experienced by any type t,
because the prudent and the regretful individuals have to be evaluated with
the preferences of the former, it follows that ρP = ρR. Let us assume now
that the regret function of the regretful individual is strictly smaller than
the one of the spendthrift. We know that in the optimal allocation average
expenditure must equal the per capita amount of resources. Given that all
money collected via taxes is intended to treat just the regretful and the
spendthrifts, and that ρS > 0, it must be the case that bundle zS is between
the budget line and the indifference curve that defines the level of utility
of her most preferred bundle. In such a situation, we can move to a new
incentive-compatible allocation x in which the prudent and the regretful
individuals have more unhealthy habits and receive less treatment, main-
taining the value of the spendthrifts’ regret function. In the same allocation
a regretful individual would be worse off, albeit the value of her regret func-
tion would still be smaller than that of the spendthrifts. Therefore, we would
be keeping the highest value of ρ while saving a positive amount of resources,
and hence this situation cannot be optimal. The graphic representation is
provided in Figure 9a.
Let us suppose now the relation is the other way round, that is, ρR > ρS .
In this case, if the public authority both limits the unhealthy consumption
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(a) case ρR < ρS (b) case ρR > ρS
Figure 9: Proof of proposition 3.a
and taxes the individuals, it is possible to reach a new incentive compatible
allocation x in which the planner saves some money, and the regretful remain
with the same value of ρS . Again, this allocation cannot be optimal. The
graphic representation of this case is provided in Figure 9b.
• The second conclusion of Proposition 3 is an obvious result that comes
directly from the fact that it is impossible to distinguish between those
that regret their past choices and the spendthrifts. Therefore, the relevant
parameter is not the fraction of the regretful, α, but the final number of
people that must be treated, λ.
• Let us take an allocation z ∈ Zn. First, we are going to prove that
hzP > h
z
S . Let us assume, contrary to the desired result, that h
z
P < h
z
S .
We already know that all bundles must be in the indifference curve of the
prudent, that is zP ∼S zS . Because of the single crossing-property and the
definition of the preferences, under hzP < h
z
S we have that zP ∼S zS ⇒
zP S zS , and hence the allocation cannot be incentive-compatible (see
Figure 10a). In the latter scenario, based again on the same properties, it is
possible to find an alternative allocation x in which the bundle of one type
remains fixed, while the other type, S in Figure 10b, can be moved to a new
bundle in which their utility level is kept at a strictly lower cost. Therefore,
such an allocation cannot be optimal. This result, combined with the first
part of the proposition, also entails that in optimal allocation z ∈ Zn we
have that czS > c
z
P .
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(a) case hzP < h
z
S (b) case h
z
P = h
z
S
Figure 10: Proof of proposition 3.c
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